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Abstract
Objective To evaluate the potential impact of two alcohol control policies
under consideration in England: banning below cost selling of alcohol
and minimum unit pricing.
DesignModelling study using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model version
2.5.
Setting England 2014-15.
Population Adults and young people aged 16 or more, including
subgroups of moderate, hazardous, and harmful drinkers.
Interventions Policy to ban below cost selling, which means that the
selling price to consumers could not be lower than tax payable on the
product, compared with policies of minimum unit pricing at £0.40 (€0.57;
$0.75), 45p, and 50p per unit (7.9 g/10 mL) of pure alcohol.
Main outcome measures Changes in mean consumption in terms of
units of alcohol, drinkers’ expenditure, and reductions in deaths, illnesses,
admissions to hospital, and quality adjusted life years.
Results The proportion of the market affected is a key driver of impact,
with just 0.7% of all units estimated to be sold below the duty plus value
added tax threshold implied by a ban on below cost selling, compared
with 23.2% of units for a 45p minimum unit price. Below cost selling is
estimated to reduce harmful drinkers’ mean annual consumption by just
0.08%, around 3 units per year, compared with 3.7% or 137 units per
year for a 45p minimum unit price (an approximately 45 times greater
effect). The ban on below cost selling has a small effect on population
health—saving an estimated 14 deaths and 500 admissions to hospital
per annum. In contrast, a 45p minimum unit price is estimated to save
624 deaths and 23 700 hospital admissions. Most of the harm reductions
(for example, 89% of estimated deaths saved per annum) are estimated
to occur in the 5.3% of people who are harmful drinkers.
Conclusions The ban on below cost selling, implemented in the England
in May 2014, is estimated to have small effects on consumption and
health harm. The previously announced policy of a minimum unit price,
if set at expected levels between 40p and 50p per unit, is estimated to
have an approximately 40-50 times greater effect.
Introduction
The UK government has been considering different policy
options to regulate the price of alcohol in England and Wales.
Increasing the price of alcohol has been shown to be effective
in reducing both consumption levels1 and harms.2 Recent
Canadian research shows that minimum pricing policies reduce
total alcohol consumption, shift consumption away from high
strength beverages, and reduce alcohol related admissions to
hospital.3 4 In 2010, the UK government proposed a “ban on
below cost selling,” which would target drinks that are currently
sold so cheaply that their price is below the cost of production
and retail.5 In principle this would affect alcohol wherever sold,
but in practice such cheap drinks are sold in supermarkets and
other shops (the “off-trade”) rather than in pubs, clubs, bars,
and restaurants (the “on-trade”). In the absence of detailed,
commercially sensitive information on production and retail
costs, the government developed a simplified policy, which
proposed that the selling price to consumers could not be lower
than the tax payable on the product. In the United Kingdom,
tax on alcohol has two components: the alcohol beverage
specific duty, for example, £28.22 (€35.57; $46.10) per litre of
pure alcohol for spirits as of March 2014, and a sales value
added tax (VAT), which is currently an additional 20% on top
of the price of the product. Thus the selling price for a product
under a ban on below cost selling (BBCS) policy would not be
allowed to be lower than PriceBBCS=duty+duty×20%. Because
the alcohol duty rates vary for different drinks, a ban on below
cost selling would target those drinks that currently have higher
duty rates (for example, spirits) and have less effect on drinks
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with lower duty rates (for example, cider). In 2012 the UK
government announced an alternative policy for its alcohol
strategy—a minimum unit price for alcohol6—and levels
discussed ranged between 40p and 50p per unit. In 2013 the
government then withdrew this commitment and returned to its
previous ban on below cost selling policy, which it subsequently
introduced in May 2014.7 Under a minimum unit price policy,
the minimum selling price increases in proportion to the alcohol
units contained in the drink (1 unit=7.9 g/10 mL of pure
ethanol). Thus a minimum unit price measure would target those
drinks that are high in alcohol content and sold relatively
cheaply; drinks that are favoured more by those drinking at
harmful levels.8 For eight example purchases, table 1⇓ shows
that a ban on below cost selling thresholds would differ
considerably compared with, for example, a 45p minimum unit
price level, and that since the duty on cider is low and does not
increase in line with alcohol content, the ban on below cost
selling threshold falls as low as 6p per unit for high strength
cider.
The potential effects of a minimum unit price in England were
previously examined in 2009-10.8 9The Sheffield Alcohol Policy
Model (version 2.0) used consumption survey data from the
general lifestyle survey 2006 as the baseline year. The model
also included levels of purchasing and prices paid from the
expenditure and food surveys 2001-06 and commercially
available population level distributions for prices paid for
various alcohol beverage types from the commercial market
research companies CGA Strategy and AC Nielsen for 2008.
Baseline levels of the harms associated with alcohol were taken
from 2005 for admissions to hospital and mortality in 47
diseases.10 The model estimated changes in consumption and
the levels of harms over a 10 year period after the introduction
of the policy, examining 54 subgroups of the population based
on age, sex, and three levels of consumption (moderate,
hazardous, and harmful). The research report and subsequent
publications examined the potential impact of a minimum unit
price threshold, ranging from 20p to 70p per unit.8 The findings
contributed substantially to the debate surrounding pricing
regulation and future policy options.11 12 Several areas were
identified for further development of both the version 2.0 model
and the evidence used within it. In particular, further evidence
and analyses on the price elasticities for alcohol (which are used
to quantify the relation between price changes and consumption
changes) were a priority. The original work used cross sectional
analysis of five years of data from the expenditure and food
survey to estimate price elasticities for the main analysis, and
also tested how sensitive the results were to alternative estimates
taken from the research literature. The previousmodel combined
beers and ciders, which would be better separated given their
different duty rates and consumption patterns.
We defined moderate drinking as alcohol intake up to 21 units
per week for males and 14 units per week for females, and
non-drinkers were included in this group; hazardous drinking
as alcohol intake between 21 and 50 units per week for males
and between 14 and 35 units for females; and harmful drinking
as alcohol intake of more than 50 units per week for males and
over 35 units for females.
In this study we have developed a new version of the Sheffield
Alcohol Policy Model (version 2.5) in which we have updated
data on baseline consumption and prices; developed new
estimates on price elasticity accounting for the longitudinal
aspects of the expenditure and food survey data (now renamed
as the living costs and food survey), separated cider from beers;
and incorporated greater subgroup functionality including the
ability to define socioeconomic subgroups.13 The Sheffield
Alcohol PolicyModel (version 2.5) is used to address the current
research question: What would be the differential potential
impact of a ban on below cost selling versus a minimum unit
price policy of 40p, 45p, or 50p if the policies were to be
implemented in 2014-15? In particular, what are the estimated
potential effects on alcohol consumption, consumer spending,
tax and duty revenues, and health harms, including deaths,
admissions to hospital, quality of life, and costs to the National
Health Service of these outcomes?
Methods
Overview of the model
The aim of Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (version 2.5) is to
appraise a wide variety of policy options, including minimum
unit pricing through analysis of selected costs and benefits. This
involves modelling a linked series of policy outcomes for 96
population subgroups defined by sex, age, annual income, and
consumption level. The outcomes are: the effect of the policy
on the distribution of prices for different types of alcohol; the
effect of changes in price on alcohol consumption; the effect of
changes in alcohol consumption on revenue for retailers, the
exchequer, and consumer spending on alcohol; and the effect
of changes in alcohol consumption on levels of alcohol related
admissions to hospital and deaths and quality adjusted life years
lost. The model also appraises effects on crime and workplace
outcomes (not reported here). The methods used are set out
below (see supplementary technical appendix for full details).
Baseline data
The modelling begins with individual level baseline data from
the general lifestyle survey 2009 on mean weekly and peak day
consumption (a proxy for individuals’ scale of binge drinking)
of alcohol for 11 385 people in England. It considers 96
subgroups split by age, sex, mean consumption level (moderate,
hazardous, and harmful), and income (low and higher income).
(We define low income as those below the relative poverty line,
defined as 60% of median equivalised household income and
higher income as people above the relative poverty line.) Data
on prices paid and quantity purchased by each subgroup for 10
different beverage types (off-trade and on-trade beer, cider,
wine, spirits, and ready to drinks “alcopops”) are available from
the living costs and food survey, an annual two week purchasing
diary survey of around 6500 UK households. We utilised data
on prices paid for England only, for the years 2001-02 to 2009,
a sample of 227 933 purchasing transactions. These self reported
prices paid for alcohol are known to over-estimate the mean
price paid,9 and we adjust them so that the distribution of actual
amounts of alcohol bought at different price levels match with
actual sales prices in the market using 2011 data from AC
Nielsen and CGA Strategy.
Process for estimating effect of price change
on consumption for population subgroups
A minimum unit price or a ban on below cost selling policy is
assumed to increase all product prices below the policy threshold
up to exactly the threshold level, and it is further assumed to
affect none of the products currently priced above the threshold.
The percentage change in mean price paid in each subgroup for
the 10 beverage types is used to estimate the effect of price
changes on consumption. This is done in conjunction with own
price elasticities (for example, percentage change in
consumption of off-trade beer given a 1% increase in off-trade
beer price), and cross price elasticities (for example, percentage
change in off-trade beer consumption given a 1% increase in
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the price of another product, for example, off-trade spirits).
When a change in prices is inputted as a model scenario, the
percentage change in mean weekly consumption for each
population subgroup is estimated for each beverage. This is then
applied to the corresponding individual level consumption data
in the model. Each individual’s percentage change in peak daily
consumption is indirectly modelled using a linear regression,
with peak daily consumption estimated as a function of mean
weekly consumption, age, and sex.
Estimating price elasticities for alcohol
To estimate the effect of changing prices on consumption, a
new set of price elasticity models have been developed. Full
details on the statistical approach and the model fit can be found
elsewhere.14 Technically, we used individual level data from
the living costs and food survey for 2001 to 2009 to construct
a time series pseudopanel for 72 defined population groups
based on sex, birth year, and socioeconomic status. Within each
population group, in each year, and for each of the 10 beverage
categories, we calculated the mean number of units purchased
and the mean price paid. A set of 10 fixed effects regression
models were then fitted to estimate the own and cross price
elasticities. Covariates adjusted for in the final models were
income, age, and proportions of individuals in each population
group having children, and being married, unemployed, and a
smoker. Table 2⇓ shows the resulting own price and cross price
elasticities. To illustrate the interpretation, the own price
elasticity for off-trade beer (top left cell of matrix) was −0.980,
which means that a 1% increase in the price of off-trade beer
would be estimated to result in a 0.98% reduction in the amount
purchased. Similarly, there can be switching between drinks
when prices change, so for example (two cells to the right), a
1% increase in off-trade beer was estimated to produce a slight
increase of 0.096% in purchasing of off-trade wine. To examine
the effects of uncertainty, we also carried out runs of the
Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (version 2.5) using alternative
definitions to generate the pseudopanel purchasing groups, and
using probabilistic sensitivity analysis accounting for variable
uncertainty reported in the regression coefficients.15 16
Note that different subgroups in Sheffield Alcohol PolicyModel
(version 2.5) experience different scales of effect due to a price
change because for each subgroup we accounted for data on
their preferences for the 10 categories of beverage (for example,
middle aged women drink more wine at home, younger men
drink more beer on nights out) and data on the prices paid for
each of the 10 beverages (for example, harmful drinkers spend
less per unit on average). Thus, the 10×10 matrix of price
elasticities means that each of the 96 modelled population
subgroups essentially has a different overall price elasticity and
a different scale of response to a given policy (for example,
drinkers who favour cheaper cider would be more affected by
aminimum unit price because their beverages would experience
a relatively large increase in price and also because the own
price elasticity for off-trade cider is relatively large at −1.268).
Risk functions and modelling process for
health harms
The baseline and estimated post-policy consumption data for
each of the population subgroups feed into a second model
component relating changes in consumption to changes in harm.
We model the effects of consumption changes on mortality and
disease prevalence for 47 conditions defined by the international
classification of diseases, 10th revision (ICD-10) codes.10 The
modelling uses epidemiological risk functions, which one can
visualise as a graph, with the x axis being level of consumption
of alcohol in units and the y axis being the risk of harm, for
example, relative risk of mortality from oesophageal cancer
(ICD10 code C15). We partitioned the diseases into four
categories: chronic or acute conditions, which were attributable
partially or wholly to alcohol. For partially attributable chronic
conditions, we used functions relating an individual’s mean
consumption to his or her health risk from the published
literature.15 For partially attributable acute conditions, published
literature is more limited, and we quantified functions relating
highest daily consumption to risk by calibrating the slope of an
assumed linear risk function to published evidence of the alcohol
attributable fractions for each condition (see details8). For wholly
attributable chronic and acute conditions, we similarly calibrated
functions relating either mean weekly units or maximum daily
consumption to absolute risk to published evidence on the
absolute number of cases observed.8
This process was undertaken both for annual mortality risk for
each condition and for morbidity risk, where morbidity was
defined as the annual rate of person specific admissions to
hospital. Condition specific mortality rates for each age and sex
based subgroup are taken from published analyses of 2005-06
Office for National Statistics, and morbidity rates from 2005-06
hospital episodes statistics.10
The modelled change in consumption for each subgroup then
feeds into a change in relative or absolute risk, and the potential
impact fraction method17 is used to adjust observed mortality
and morbidity rates. For chronic conditions, there can be a time
lag between population level changes in alcohol consumption
and changes in outcome, and we chose a linear time lag function
of 10 years to realisation of full effect, which is consistent with
average estimates in the literature.18
Framework for base case and sensitivity
analyses
For all ban on below cost selling analyses, we estimated the
average duty plus VAT per unit of alcohol for beer, cider, wine,
spirits, and ready to drink beverages (or alcopops) in the United
Kingdom based on the duty rates set by HerMajesty’s Revenue
and Customs effective from 25 March 2013. We used several
assumptions to estimate these thresholds because different duty
rates exist for the same modelled beverage type (for example,
there are currently three duty rates for beer which increase with
alcohol content) and because duty rates for cider and wine are
calculated based on product volume rather than on ethanol
content. (For full details see supplementary technical appendix
table 13.1 or table 1 in Meng et al16.)
The set of policies analysed are a ban on below cost selling and
minimum unit price polices with thresholds of 40p, 45p, and
50p in 2014-15 prices. We particularly focus on 45p as this was
the level proposed by the UK government. The model actually
uses 2011 as the baseline year because this is our most recently
availably price distribution data.We adjusted for future beverage
specific retail price indices using estimates provided by the
HomeOffice (for details see supplementary technical Appendix
table 5.3).
The analysis reported here applies the elasticity matrix estimated
in table 2. See online for the full details on methods and results
of sensitivity analyses undertaken to test the robustness of our
results under alternative elasticity matrices (for example,
assuming no substitution effects, excluding non-significant
(P<0.05) elasticities, separate matrices for low income and
higher income groups, and separate matrices for moderate versus
hazardous or harmful groups).16
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Results
The proportion of the market that would be affected by price
regulation is the key driver of the scale of estimated policy
impact. Overall, just 0.7% of alcohol units are estimated to be
sold below the ban on below cost selling duty plus VAT
threshold. In contrast, a 45p minimum unit price would affect
23.2% of all units. For analyses across subgroups, baseline
consumption and prices paid are shown in table 3⇓. Harmful
drinkers are a policy priority group, as they consume
substantially (on average 58 units per week for females, 80 units
for males) and spend substantially (£1800 and £3400 per annum,
respectively). Of the population aged 16 or more, 2.2 million
(5.3%) are harmful drinkers, 7.2 million (17.3%) are hazardous
drinkers, and 25.5 million (61.5%) are moderate drinkers. The
proportion of alcohol affected by a minimum unit price varied
across these subgroups: for example, a 45p minimum unit price
would affect 12.5%, 19.5%, and 30.5% of units sold tomoderate,
hazardous, and harmful drinkers, respectively. In contrast, table
3 and figure1⇓ show that the impact of a ban on below cost
selling on all drinkers would be minimal, and just 1.0% of units
currently consumed by harmful drinkers would be affected.
Table 4⇓ shows the estimated impact on consumption and on
spending for subgroups. A ban on below cost selling was
estimated to reduce harmful drinkers’ mean annual consumption
by around 3 units (approximately 1.5 fewer pints of beer in a
year). In contrast, a 45p minimum unit price was estimated to
reduce harmful drinkers’ consumption by 137 units per year;
an approximately 45 times greater effect than a ban on below
cost selling. Changes in spending were relatively small for all
subgroups under a 45p minimum unit price. This is because
several price elasticity estimates for beverage types particularly
affected by these policies (see table 2) are around −1.000,
indicating that as people face increased prices for these products
they reduce purchasing to an extent that maintains their current
level of spending. Thus, for example, although harmful drinkers
were estimated to reduce mean annual consumption by 137
units, because the products that they buy would now have higher
prices mean spending was estimated to change for this subgroup
by just minus £1.70 per year (0.06% of the £2771 total). For a
45p minimum unit price, moderate drinkers on average were
barely affected in terms of both mean consumption and mean
spending (a reduction of 1.6 units—less than one pint of beer
per annum and an increase in spending per annum of 90p).
Figure 2⇓ illustrates the 45-fold greater effectiveness of a 45p
minimum unit price over a ban on below cost selling in terms
of reductions in consumption.
The estimates for reduction in health harm again show that a
ban on below cost selling has minimal effect (table 5⇓). For
example, 10 years after policy implementation, the ban on below
cost selling showed a saving of just 14 deaths and around 500
admissions to hospital per annum, which compared with an
estimated 624 deaths and 23 700 admissions prevented by a 45p
minimum unit price—around a 40 to 50 times greater effect
than a ban on below cost selling. A similar pattern was shown
for the cumulative measures of harm reduction over 10 years,
which were each almost 50 times higher for a 45p minimum
unit price versus a ban on below cost selling—for example, total
quality adjusted life year (QALY) gains for England (24 200 v
500), healthcare cost savings (−£9.5m v −£417.2m), and the
financial valuation of the QALY gains assuming a £60 000
value for one quality adjusted life year in line with Department
for Health guidance (£33m v £1591).Most of the harm reduction
occurred in those 5.3% of people who were harmful drinkers
(for example, for a 45p minimum unit price, 554 of the 624
deaths equated to 89% of the estimated overall death reduction).
Figure 3⇓ illustrates the 40-fold difference between harm
reduction estimates for a 45p minimum unit price and those for
a ban on below cost selling, and also shows that as the threshold
of alternative values for a minimum unit price was increased
(for example, 40p, 45p, 50p), thus covering more of the market
of products, then the estimated harm reductions increased.
The wider economic effects on retailer revenues and tax
revenues have also been examined. In summary, retailer
revenues in shops and supermarkets (the off-trade) for a 45p
minimum unit price are estimated to increase by 5.6% or
£201.1m while for a ban on below cost selling the effects are
small: a 0.2% or £5.4m increase. One would expect that this
increase in revenues would imply an increase in profits on
alcohol sales for off-trade retailers but, without access to the
details of retailers’ cost base, a quantified calculation of profits
cannot be undertaken. In contrast, the effects on government
tax revenue are small, primarily because the two separate tax
effects counteract each other. Alcohol duty revenue will fall a
little because it is related to the volume of alcohol sold, but
VAT will rise a little because it is charged as a percentage of
product price and products are being sold at higher prices. The
net effect was estimated at decreased total alcohol tax revenues
of £48.5m or 0.6% for a 45p minimum unit price and £1.5m or
0.02% for a ban on below cost selling.
Several sensitivity analyses have been undertaken on these
central estimates to consider uncertainty. Details of all of these
are provided in the report sent to the UKHomeOffice to inform
its responses to a consultation on minimum unit pricing, which
can be seen online.15 16 The results support the above findings
on the comparative effectiveness of a ban on below cost selling
and a minimum unit price but suggest that the base case
minimum unit price model may be conservative in its estimates
of policy effectiveness.
Discussion
This study quantifies the potential impact of the UK
government’s policy of a ban on selling alcohol for less than
the cost of the payable duty and VAT using the Sheffield
Alcohol Policy Model (version 2.5) to estimate the proportion
of products affected, the reduced consumption of alcohol by
different population subgroups, and the resulting harm
reductions. The findings suggest that the effects of a ban on
below cost selling would be small—a −0.04% change in
consumption and a central estimate for the reduction in deaths
of just 14 per year at full effect. We have compared this with
the minimum unit price policy originally proposed by the prime
minister in the government’s alcohol strategy6 and find that such
a policy would have an estimated 40-50-fold greater effect than
a ban on below cost selling. Sensitivity analyses on these effects
suggest that the relative scale of impact between a ban on below
cost selling and a minimum unit price are robust to a variety of
assumptions and uncertainties.
The study has also examined subgroup impacts, showing that
the greatest effects of a 45p minimum unit price policy would
be in harmful drinkers. This is because they are the group that
buys the greatest share of the cheaply priced alcohol, faces
greater price increases than for example moderate drinkers if a
45p minimum unit price were implemented, and buys in larger
volumes thus incurring larger absolute reductions in
consumption leading to larger harm reductions. For a 45p
minimum unit price, they are estimated to reduce consumption
by 137 units per year on average and gain in terms of an
estimated reduced mortality rate of 550 fewer deaths per year.
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In contrast, the 61.5% of the population who are moderate
drinkers are on average affected little—a mean reduction in
consumption of 1.6 units per year and spending increase of just
90p per year for a 45p minimum unit price.
Strengths and weaknesses of this study
Our study has several limitations in relation to the evidence
base available. Self report surveys can be problematic for
under-recording alcohol consumption (general lifestyle survey)
and purchasing (living costs and food survey), which will affect
the results for change in consumption and spending.19
Potentially, under-recording could also affect the estimation of
harm reduction; although this is less clear because there is debate
on whether surveys underpinning the risk function literature
measure exposure to alcohol in a way that is consistent with our
surveys or otherwise.20 In the absence of a single dataset
recording both purchase and consumption, the model assumes
that a 1% change in purchasing by an individual equates to a
1% change in consumption, although with a ban on below cost
selling effect of −0.04%, plausible alternative assumptions
would make a negligible difference. The measure of binge
drinking available in the general lifestyle survey (consumption
on the peak drinking day in the seven days before the survey)
also has limitations, and we are beginning to explore the use of
more refined measures of binge behaviour, including frequency
of drinking occasions and level of consumption on each
occasion.21 Evidence shows that the relation between
consumption and health risk may differ for mortality compared
withmorbidity for some conditions.22However, as such evidence
is not available for all conditions, we do not model separate
mortality and morbidity risk relations, although this would be
possible as the evidence base develops. Price elasticities are
also an important driver of the results and, although we have
further improved our price elasticity estimates in this version
of the model, the ideal data, a longitudinal population panel
collecting both prices paid and amounts consumed for the
various categories of alcohol, is not available in the United
Kingdom (see details in Meng et al14). The model as it stands
is valid when comparing the differences between two pricing
policies. In quantifying these differences it makes the
assumption that, all other things being equal, the patterns of
population consumption would remain as they are currently
evidenced in the most recent baseline year, rather than having
a dynamic long term trend analysis. This means that the model
provides an estimate of the incremental difference between
“with minimum unit price policy” and “without minimum unit
price policy” but does not directly account for concurrent effects
of other policies or societal trends on any of the outcome
measures used. For example, the model results are not adjusted
for trends in macroeconomic factors affecting alcohol
affordability, such as changes in incomes or changes in
macroeconomic growth, nor are they adjusted for the effects of
other alcohol policy interventions operating simultaneously,
such as increased use of screening and brief interventions, which
we have previously estimated to be cost effective.23
Strengths andweaknesses in relation to other
studies
This study has several strengths in relation to our own previously
published work, which addresses minimum unit pricing but not
a ban on below cost selling.8 9 We have extended the categories
of alcoholic beverages to separate out cider, which has a
different duty regimen, and this was an important development
to allow more robust analysis of a ban on below cost selling.
We have updated the data on consumption to 2009. We have
recalibrated the relevant disease risk functions.We have updated
prices paid using both new living costs and food survey and
data from the commercial market research companies AC
Nielsen and CGA Strategy for the years 2009 and 2011,
respectively. Most importantly, rather than analysing the data
on prices paid in a purely cross sectional manner we have
generated new estimates of price elasticity effects, which
incorporate a degree of longitudinality into the analysis.
Considering that the pricing policies being discussed here have
either never been implemented in the United Kingdom or have
only recently been implemented, there is currently a lack of data
with which to validate our findings. However, we have also
applied these methods to two Canadian provinces,24 the results
of which can be compared with external data. Ontario and
British Columbia have both government liquor stores and an
extensive network of private liquor stores, which are required
to comply with minimum price regulations for each beverage
type. We applied the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (version
2.0) framework to these provinces, using Canadian data on
alcohol consumption, alcohol purchasing, and rates of harm.
We compared Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model estimates to
those obtained from statistical analyses of prices, health
outcomes, and hospital admissions in British Columbia between
2002 and 2009.3 25 The estimates obtained using the Sheffield
Alcohol Policy Model (version 2.0) approach seem to be
conservative compared with actual results, with estimates
typically less than half those from the statistical modelling. This
is consistent with our approach of, where necessary, making
conservative assumptions so as not to overstate the potential
impact of minimum unit pricing policies. For example, the
assumption that higher priced products are not affected by
setting aminimum unit price may be conservative, and Canadian
evidence from British Columbia has found that when minimum
prices were raised, the prices of some more costly beverages
also increased.4 A second example relates to evidence that is
also emerging in Canada whereby the assumption of a lag
function of 10 years to realise a full effect on chronic disease
outcomes may also be conservative because statistically
significant impacts on alcohol related disease have been found
between two and four years after prices changed.25
Meaning of the study: possible explanations
and implications for clinicians and
policymakers
The reasons why the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (version
2.5) estimates a 45p minimum unit price has such greater
estimated impact than a ban on below cost selling are clear—a
greater proportion of the market is affected and to a greater
extent and this is especially true for harmful drinkers. It is this
more specific targeting of harmful drinkers that sets the
minimum unit pricing policies aside from for example general
price or tax increases across the board. From a national policy
perspective, the UK government has recently implemented the
ban on below cost selling but has indicated that it will watch
with interest events in Scotland. The Scottish government passed
legislation to introduce a 50p minimum unit price after
reviewing analyses using the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model
(version 2.0)26, but has not been able to implement the policy
owing to a legal challenge from the ScotchWhisky Association.
The Republic of Ireland has also committed to introducing a
similar policy in conjunctionwith Northern Ireland.More locally
in the United Kingdom, several local authorities are considering
or have enacted forms of price agreements or voluntary
restrictions on sale of high strength low cost alcohol with local
retailers,27 28 and this study suggests that agreements focusing
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on alcohol sold at 40p, 45p, or 50p per unit could have
substantive effects in relation to drinker related harms.
Unanswered questions and future research
A key unanswered question is the relative effectiveness of
minimum unit pricing when compared with general increases
in tax. It would be of great interest and value to decision makers
to analyse the comparative effects of further pricing policy
options by, for example, quantifying the scale of increase in
excise duty necessary to have equivalent consumption or harm
reductions as those modelled here for a 45pminimum unit price,
and to investigate what the impact of such duty increases would
be onmoderate drinkers. To do so requires analysis of duty rates
and also the extent to which tax rises are passed on to consumers
by retailers after they are implemented by government.29 This
tax pass-through and comparative analysis is a topic of our
ongoing research.
In addition to our analysis of health harms as described in this
paper, a wider public health perspective can be used, and
estimates are also available on the effects of these policies in
terms of reductions in crime and absence from work. Beyond
these policy research questions at national and local level,
methodological issues remain around estimating the joint impact
of price policies implemented alongside other interventions and
services such as screening and brief interventions or specialist
treatment services for dependent drinkers; the financial valuation
of harms; and quantifying the harms done to others (for example,
in families) rather than to drinkers themselves.
Conclusion
The UK government’s recently implemented ban on below cost
selling affects just 0.7% of alcohol units currently sold and is
estimated to have small effects on consumption and health harm.
The previously considered policy of a minimum unit price, if
set at expected levels between 40p and 50p per unit, is estimated
to have an approximately 40-50 times greater effect.
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2010 analyses showed the estimated impact of different possible thresholds for a minimum unit price for alcohol in England and found
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That research also suggests that the Sheffield Alcohol Model provides conservative estimates of harm reductions
What this study adds
The proportion of the market affected by the two policies differs hugely, with just 0.7% of all alcohol units sold likely to be affected under
a ban on below cost selling compared with 23.2% of units for a 45p minimum unit price
Below cost selling would save an estimated 14 deaths and 500 admissions to hospital annually, compared with 624 deaths and 23 700
admissions for a 45p minimum unit price
This study found very small estimated effects for banning below cost selling and showed, in comparison, that a minimum unit price of
45p would be expected to have 40-50 times larger reductions in consumption and health harms
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Tables
Table 1| Example prices for different product categories under a ban on below cost selling compared with minimum unit pricing
Product (duty category)
4×175 mL
bottles of ready
to drink
“alcopops”
(spirits)
700mL bottle
of vodka
(spirits)
750mL bottle
of red wine
(wine)
750 mL bottle
of white wine
(wine)
2 L bottle of
strong cider
(threshold
strength for
normal strength
cider)
4×440 mL cans
of cider
(normal
strength cider)
4×440 mL cans
of strong beer
(high strength
beer)
4×440 mL cans
of beer (normal
strength beer)
17.5040.0014.0011.007.505.009.004.00% alcohol by volume
12.32810.58.3158.815.87.0No of units
Implied minimum price
Under minimum unit
pricing policy proposed
in 2012:
4.9011.204.203.306.003.526.342.8240 pence per unit (£)
5.5112.604.733.716.753.967.133.1745 pence per unit (£)
6.1314.005.254.137.504.407.923.5250 pence per unit (£)
Under ban on below
cost selling:
4.159.482.402.460.950.844.571.58Duty+VAT threshold
(£)
0.340.340.230.300.060.100.290.22Implied threshold
price per unit (pence)
VAT=value added tax.
£1.00 (€1.26; $1.63); 2014 rates.
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Table 2| Base case estimated own price and cross price elasticities for off-trade and on-trade beer, cider, wine, spirits, and ready to drinks
(RTDs, or “alcopops”) in the United Kingdom
Purchase
On-RTDsOn-spiritsOn-wineOn-ciderOn-beerOff-RTDsOff-spiritsOff-wineOff-ciderOff-beer
0.5030.0300.253−0.050−0.016−1.092−0.3680.096−0.189−0.980*‡Off†-beerPrice
–0.194–0.1080.0670.093–0.053−0.239−0.1220.118−1.268*‡0.065Off-cider
0.110–0.1860.043–0.155–0.2450.0390.363−0.384*‡0.736*−0.040Off–wine
0.2330.0840.0050.4060.167–0.042−0.082‡0.163−0.0240.113Off-spirits
0.093–0.179*0.0680.067–0.061–0.585*‡0.079−0.006−0.159−0.047Off-RTDs
–0.1171.169*1.042*0.867–0.786*‡0.803−0.0280.115−0.2850.148On¶-beer
0.2410.237*0.072–0.591*‡0.0350.3650.0210.0430.071−0.100On-cider
–0.363–0.021–0.871*‡–0.031–0.276–0.093−0.031−0.1540.094−0.197On-wine
0.809*–0.890*‡0.109–0.284–0.002–0.145−0.280−0.027−0.1170.019On-spirits
–0.187‡–0.071–0.027–0.3940.1210.369−0.047−0.0850.0050.079On-RTDs
Each cell gives the estimated percentage reduction in consumption that would occur for the column beverage after a 1% increase in price for the row beverage.
*Significant coefficients at P<0.05.
†Off-beverages are those purchased in off-trade outlets (for example, supermarkets and other shops).
‡Own-price elasticities, with remaining cells showing cross price elasticities.
§¶On-beverages are those purchased in on-trade outlets (for example, pubs, clubs, bars, and restaurants).
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Table 3| Baseline patterns of consumption and spending on alcohol in England for drinkers aged 16 or more
Drinker subgroups
Variables All drinkers averageHarmful‡Hazardous†
Moderate, excluding
abstainers*
34.92.27.225.5Population in England§ (millions)
Self reported alcohol consumption¶
14.171.427.25.5Mean weekly consumption (total No of
units)**
Category of alcohol (%):
40443839Beer
4633Cider
41344642Wine
12121115Spirit
3422Ready to drink
Self reported alcohol expenditure††
Mean spend per annum (£):
61227711143275Total
234118946985Off-trade‡‡
3781582673191On-trade§§
Mean price paid (pence/unit):
51.048.151.354.4Off-trade
136.5126.6133.6148.1On-trade
% of units purchased below various
threshold prices/unit:
0.71.00.50.3Duty+VAT¶¶
11.915.310.36.840p per unit***
23.230.519.512.545p per unit***
34.443.630.519.550p per unit***
£1.00 (€1.26; $1.63); 2014 rates.
VAT=value added tax.
*Adult drinkers (≥16) with a mean weekly consumption ≤21 units for males and ≤14 units for females.
†Mean weekly consumption >21 units for males and >14 units for females but ≤50 units for males and ≤35 units for females.
‡Mean weekly consumption >50 units for males and >35 units for females.
§From Office for National Statistics mid-2010 population estimates for England (ages 16-89 inclusive), combined with proportions from general lifestyle survey
2009.
¶From general lifestyle survey 2009.
**1 unit=10 mL by volume of ethanol.
††From living cost and food survey 2001-02 to 2009, inflated to 2013 prices with off-trade interpolated over AC Nielsen price distribution.
‡‡Off-beverages are those purchased in off-trade outlets (for example, supermarkets and other shops).
§§On-beverages are those purchased in on-trade outlets (for example, pubs, clubs, bars, and restaurants).
¶¶Estimated in pence per unit of alcohol: 22.9, 9.4, 24.5, 33.9, and 33.9 for beer, cider, wine, spirits, and ready to drinks, respectively in 2013 prices. Details of
assumptions are in table 1 of the addendum of the published report.16
***Minimum unit price thresholds in 2014-15 prices. Details of assumptions can be found in table 2.1 of the published report.13
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Table 4| Central estimates for consumption and spending for ban on below cost selling and minimum unit price policies of 40p, 45p, and
50p per unit
All England population (≥16)Harmful drinkersHazardous drinkersModerate drinkersConsumption and spending levels
% change in consumption per drinker
–0.04–0.08–0.01–0.03Below cost selling
Minimum unit price:
–0.97–2.33–0.34–0.3440p
–1.59–3.67–0.67–0.5745p
–2.47–5.37–1.22–0.9750p
Change in consumption per drinker per year (units)
–0.3–3.0–0.1–0.1Below cost selling
Minimum unit price:
–7.2–86.7–4.8–1.040p
–11.7–136.6–9.5–1.645p
–18.2–200.0–17.3–2.750p
% change in spending per drinker
0.020.010.030.00Below cost selling
Minimum unit price:
0.02–0.360.290.0240p
0.42–0.060.850.3445p
1.180.571.850.9350p
Change in spending per drinker per year (£)
0.090.270.330.01Below cost selling
Minimum unit price:
0.10–9.923.350.0540p
2.59–1.709.750.9345p
7.2315.6921.132.5550p
£1.00 (€1.26; $1.63); 2014 rates.
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Table 5| Central estimates of harm reduction for ban on below cost selling and minimum unit price policies of 40p, 45p, and 50p per unit
Cumulative health harmYear 10 health harmYear 1 health harm reductions
Policies
10 year
financial
valuation of
QALYs (£m)
10 year
cumulative
healthcare
costs (£m)
10 year
cumulative
discounted
QALYs (000s)
Hospital
admissions
annually
(000s)
Illness
annually
(000s)
Deaths
annually
QALYs
saved
(000s)
Hospital
admissions
(000s)
Illness
(000s)Deaths
England population (age ≥16)
33.0–9.50.5–0.5–0.3–140.0–0.1–0.1–3Below cost
selling
Minimum unit
price:
981.4–257.514.8–15.0–7.8–3790.8–3.5–2.4–7440p
1591.1–417.224.2–23.7–12.5–6241.2–5.7–4.0–12345p
2413.1–634.237.1–35.1–18.7–9601.9–8.7–6.2–19250p
Moderate drinkers
8.2–2.40.1–0.1–0.1–10.00.00.0–1Below cost
selling
Minimum unit
price:
148.2–30.32.5–0.8–0.6–70.2–0.5–0.4–1040p
241.5–49.54.1–1.4–1.0–110.2–0.9–0.7–1745p
388.3–82.06.6–2.4–1.7–190.4–1.4–1.2–2750p
Hazardous drinkers
5.7–1.50.1–0.10.0–30.00.00.0–1Below cost
selling
Minimum unit
price:
113.8–28.22.0–0.8–0.5–230.2–0.5–0.4–1040p
227.1–58.43.9–1.8–1.2–600.3–1.0–0.8–2145p
417.7–110.47.1–3.8–2.5–1290.5–1.8–1.5–3950p
Harmful drinkers
19.1–5.60.3–0.4–0.2–110.0–0.1–0.1–2Below cost
selling
Minimum unit
price:
719.4–199.010.3–13.4–6.7–3490.4–2.4–1.6–5340p
1122.4–309.416.2–20.5–10.3–5540.7–3.8–2.5–8545p
1607.2–441.823.4–29.0–14.5–8121.0–5.4–3.6–12550p
QALYs=quality adjusted life years.
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Figures
Fig 1 Estimated proportion of current alcohol units consumed that would be affected by price rises from proposed policies
of ban on below cost selling versus 45p minimum unit price central estimate
Fig 2 Modelled impact of a ban on below cost selling compared with impact of a 45p minimum unit price
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Fig 3 Estimated impact of a ban on below cost selling versus minimum unit price in England in terms of annual savings in
deaths, illnesses, and admissions to hospital (at full effect)
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